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Abstract
With an increasing number of users sharing information
online, privacy implications entailing such actions are a
major concern. For explicit content, such as user profile
or GPS data, devices (e.g. mobile phones) as well as web
services (e.g. facebook) offer to set privacy settings in order
to enforce the users’ privacy preferences.
We propose the first approach that extends this concept
to image content in the spirit of a Visual Privacy Advisor.
First, we categorize personal information in images into 68
image attributes and collect a dataset, which allows us to
train models that predict such information directly from im-
ages. Second, we run a user study to understand the privacy
preferences of different users w.r.t. such attributes. Third,
we propose models that predict user specific privacy score
from images in order to enforce the users’ privacy prefer-
ences. Our model is trained to predict the user specific pri-
vacy risk and even outperforms the judgment of the users,
who often fail to follow their own privacy preferences on
image data.
1. Introduction
As more people obtain access to the internet, a large
amount of personal information becomes accessible to e.g.
other users, web service providers and advertisers. To
counter these problems, more and more devices (e.g. mobile
phone) and web services (e.g. facebook) are equipped with
mechanisms where the user can specify privacy settings to
comply with his/her personal privacy preference.
While this has proven useful for explicit and textual in-
formation, we ask how this concept can generalize to vi-
sual content. While users can be asked (as we also do in
our study) to specify how comfortable they are releasing a
certain type of image content, the actual presence of such
credit card,
face, gender,
skin colour, ...
User Judgment
Visual Privacy Advisor
Privacy 
Attributes
Privacy
Preferences
Privacy
Risk
Figure 1: Users often fail to enforce their privacy prefer-
ences when sharing images online. We propose a first Visual
Privacy Advisor to provide user-specific privacy feedback.
content is implicit in the image and not readily available for
a privacy preference enforcing mechanism nor the user. In
fact – as our study shows – people frequently misjudge the
privacy relevant information content in an image – which
leads to the failure of enforcing their own privacy prefer-
ences.
Hence, we work towards a Visual Privacy Advisor (Fig-
ure 1) that helps users enforce their privacy preferences and
prevents leakage of private information. We approach this
complex problem by first making personal information ex-
plicit by categorizing personal information into 68 image
attributes. Based on such attribute predictions and user pri-
vacy preferences, we infer a privacy score that can be used
to prevent unintentional sharing of information. Our model
is trained to predict the user specific privacy risk and inter-
estingly, it outperforms human judgment on the same im-
ages.
Our main contributions in this paper are as follows:
(i) To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to formu-
late the problem of identifying a diverse set of personal in-
formation in images and personalizing predictions to users
based on their privacy preferences (ii) We provide a sizable
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dataset1 of 22k images annotated with 68 privacy attributes
(iii) We conduct a user study and analyze the diversity of
users’ privacy preferences as well as the level to which they
achieve to follow their privacy preferences on image data
(iv) We propose the first model for Privacy Attribute Pre-
diction. We also extend it to directly estimate user-specific
privacy risks (v) Finally, we show that our models outper-
form users in following their own privacy preferences on
images
2. Related Work
Privacy is becoming an increasing concern [48, 10], es-
pecially due to the rise of social networking websites al-
lowing individuals to share personal information, without
explaining consequences of these actions. In this section,
we discuss work that highlights these concerns and explores
consequences of such actions. We also discuss literature
that deals with identifying private content in images and
text.
Identifying Personal Information There is a compa-
rably small body of work that aims to recognize personal
information. Aura et al. [3] explore this in the context of
electronic documents, where they propose a tool to remove
user names, identifiers, organization names and other pri-
vate information from text-based documents with metadata.
[5, 13] study this in the context of textual email-content.
Bier et al. [5] model this as a privacy-classification problem,
whereas Geng et al. [13] detect four types of personal in-
formation – email addresses, telephone numbers, addresses
and money. The closest related work to ours is [42], who are
also motivated by unwanted disclosure and privacy viola-
tion on social media. They approach the task as classifying
if an image is public or private based on features extracted
from a Convolutional Neural Network and user-generated
tags for the image. However, we later show that users have
different notions of privacy and hence cannot be modeled
as a binary classification problem. Instead, we first tackle a
more principled problem of predicting the privacy-sensitive
elements present in images and use these in combination
with users preferences to estimate privacy risk.
Leakage and De-anonymization A problem closely re-
lated to ours is privacy leakage, which deals with uncov-
ering and analyzing methods leading to disclosure of per-
sonal information, rather than detection before such inci-
dents. [24, 22] uncover privacy leakage when websites ac-
cidentally provide user information embedded in HTTP re-
quests when contacting third-party aggregators. As leak-
ages can be user-intended, Yang et al. [47] explore this case
in Android applications. Some works [32, 43] study the
case where users identity, location or other details can be
1Refer to project website: https://tribhuvanesh.github.
io/vpa/
de-anonymized when aggregating anonymized data across
multiple social networks. In contrast to these, our approach
is concerned about image content and privacy preferences.
Privacy Preferences and Social Networks [26, 14, 23]
study types of personal information disclosed on social net-
working websites. Other tasks include preserving one’s pri-
vacy while using social networks [15, 52, 27] and explor-
ing privacy settings [11, 8, 28]. However in our user study,
apart from collecting and analyzing user studies on privacy
preferences for images, we additionally use them to train
models based on image data.
Privacy and Computer Vision Several works explore
detecting individual privacy attributes such as license plates
[53, 49, 6], age estimation from facial photographs [4], so-
cial relationships [45], face detection [40, 44], landmark de-
tection [51] and occupation recognition [39]. Apart from
detecting attributes, some works introduce new privacy
challenges in vision such as adversarial perturbations [31,
35], privacy-preserving video capture [1, 36, 33, 37], person
re-identification [2, 30], avoiding face detection [46, 16],
full body re-identification [34] and privacy-sensitive lifel-
ogging [18, 20]. In this work, we present a new challenge
in computer vision designed to help users assess privacy risk
before sharing images on social media that encompasses a
broad range of personal information in a single study.
Datasets for Privacy Tasks Crucial to exploring pri-
vacy tasks are images revealing private details such as faces,
names or opinions. However, many available datasets do
not contain a significant number of such images to effec-
tively study privacy tasks. Although some datasets [12]
contain such information, they are either too small or not
representative of images on social networks. The closest
candidate is the PIPA dataset [50] with 37,107 Flickr im-
ages, proposed for people recognition in an unconstrained
setting and does not include images covering many other
privacy aspects such as license plates, political views or
official identification documents. In this paper, we intro-
duce the first dataset of real-life images capturing important
privacy-relevant attributes.
3. The Visual Privacy (VISPR) Dataset
Mobile devices and social media platforms provide pri-
vacy settings, so that users can communicate their privacy
preferences on the disclosure of different type of textual in-
formation. How does this concept transfer to image data?
We need to establish a similar concept of privacy relevant
information types – but now for images. This will allow us
to query users about their privacy preferences on the disclo-
sure of various information types, as we will do in the next
section.
Therefore, we propose in this section a categorization of
personal information into 68 privacy attributes such as gen-
2
der, tattoo, email address or fingerprint. We collect a dataset
of 22k images that allows the study of privacy relevant at-
tributes in images and the training of automatic recognizers.
Privacy Attributes
As motivated before, we need to categorize different types
of personal content in images – akin to the privacy settings
deployed in today’s devices and services. Therefore, we
define a list of privacy attributes an image can disclose.
The primary challenge here is the lack of a standard list
of privacy attributes. We thus compile attributes from mul-
tiple sources. First, we consolidate relevant attributes from
the guidelines for handling Personally Identifiable Infor-
mation [29] provided in the EU Data Protection Directive
95/46/EC [9] and the US Privacy Act of 1974. Second, we
add relevant attributes from the rules on prohibiting sharing
personal information on various social networking websites
(e.g., Twitter, Reddit, Flickr). Finally, we manually exam-
ine images that are shared on these websites and identify
additional attributes. As a result, we draft an initial set of
104 potential privacy attributes. As discussed in the next
section, these are reduced to 68 attributes (see Table 1) after
pruning.
Annotation Setup
The annotation was set up as a multi-label task to three an-
notators annotating independent sets of images. A web-
based tool was provided to select multiple options corre-
sponding to the 104 privacy attributes per image. Addition-
ally, annotators could mark if they were unsure about their
annotation. In case none of the provided privacy labels ap-
plied, they were instructed to label the image as safe, which
we use as one of our privacy attributes. Images were dis-
carded if annotators were unsure, or if the image contained a
copyright watermark, was a historic photograph, contained
primarily non-English text, or was of poor quality.
Data Collection and Annotation Procedure
In this section, we discuss the steps taken to obtain the final
set of 22k images annotated with 68 privacy attributes.
Seed Sample We first gather 100k random images from
the OpenImages dataset [21], a collection of ∼9 million
Flickr images. Using the definition and examples of the pri-
vacy attributes, the annotators annotate 10,000 images ran-
domly selected from the downloaded images.
Handling Imbalance Based on the label statistics from
these 10,000 images, we add images to balance attributes
with fewer than 100 occurrences. These additional images
are added by querying relevant OpenImages labels possibly
representative of insufficient privacy attributes.
Split All Train Val Test
Images 22,167 10,000 4,167 8,000
Labels 115,742 51,799 22,026 41,917
Avg Labels/Image 5.22 5.18 5.29 5.24
Max Images/Label 10,460 4,710 1,969 3,781
Min Images/Label 44 20 7 12
Table 1: Dataset Statistics
Extended Search for Rare Classes In spite of using the
above strategy, 37 attributes contain under 40 images. We
manually add images for these attributes by querying rele-
vant keywords on Flickr. We do not add multiple images
from the same album. For credit cards, we manually ob-
tain 50 high-quality images from Twitter, which are the
only non-Flickr images in our dataset.
Selected Attributes After annotating the dataset with the
initial 104 labels, we discard 19 labels because either (i) im-
ages were difficult to obtain manually (e.g. iris/retinal scan,
insurance details) or (ii) the set of images did not clearly
represent the attribute. We additionally merge groups of at-
tributes which capture similar concepts (e.g. work and home
phone number). In the end, we obtain a dataset of 22,167
images, each annotated with one or more of 68 privacy at-
tributes.
Curation To reduce labeling mistakes, we organize the
dataset into batches of images with each batch correspond-
ing to a privacy attribute. We curate attribute batches which
either contain fewer than 500 images or are considered sen-
sitive by users.
Splits We perform a random 45-20-35 split with 10,000
training, 4,167 validation and 8,000 test images. The final
statistics of our dataset is presented in Table 1. The labels
and its distribution in our dataset is shown in Figure 2.
4. Understanding Privacy Risks
In this section, we explore how users’ personal privacy
preferences relate to the attributes in Section 4.1. Further-
more, we study how good users are at enforcing their own
privacy preferences on visual data when making judgments
based on image data in Section 4.2.
4.1. Understanding Users’ Privacy Preferences
In this section, we study the degree to which various
users are sensitive to the privacy attributes discussed in Sec-
tion 3.
User Study We present each user with a series of 72
questions in a randomized order. Each of these questions
corresponds to either exactly one of 67 privacy attributes
(excluding the safe attribute) or a control question. In each
3
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Figure 2: Label distribution in our dataset. Y -axis indicates the number of images.
question, the users are asked how much they would find
their privacy violated if they accidentally shared details of
a particular attribute publicly online. For instance: “How
much would you find your privacy violated if you acciden-
tally shared details on personal occasions you have attended
(like a birthday party or friend’s wedding).” Responses for
the question are collected on a scale of 1 to 5, where: (1) Pri-
vacy is not violated (2) Privacy is slightly violated (3) Pri-
vacy is somewhat violated (4) Privacy is violated (5) Privacy
is extremely violated. We treat these responses as users pri-
vacy preference for this particular privacy attribute.
Participants We collect responses of 305 unique AMT
workers in this survey. Out of the 305 respondents, 59%
were male, 78% were under 40 years of age with 57% from
USA and 38% from India. Additionally, 75% were regular
Facebook users, 80% and 44% reported to be aware of and
have used Twitter and Flickr at least once.
Analysis In order to understand the diversity in users’
privacy preferences, we first cluster the users based on their
preferences into user privacy profiles. We cluster using K-
means and choose K based on silhouette score [38], which
considers distance between points within the cluster and ad-
ditionally distance between points and their neighbouring
cluster. We choose K = 30 as this yields the lowest sil-
houette score. This enables visualizing the preferences over
the attributes, as seen in Figure 3, where each row repre-
sents the preferences for one of the 30 user profiles (ordered
based on number of users associated with the profile). We
observe from this study: (i) Users show a wide variety of
preferences. This supports requiring user-specific privacy
risk predictions. (ii) The majority (Profiles 1-4, 7-11, 13-14,
18-20 in Figure 3) display a similar order of sensitivity to
the attributes (iii) A minority (Profiles 21-30) of users are
particularly sensitive to some attributes such as their polit-
ical view, sexual orientation or religion (iv) The uniform-
ly-sensitive users (Profiles 5, 6, 12, 15, 17) are uniformly
sensitive to all attributes even though to different degrees.
4.2. Users and Visual Privacy Judgment
In this study, we first ask participants to judge their per-
sonal privacy risk based on images representing an attribute
(providing a visual privacy risk score) and afterwards asking
the actual user’s privacy preferences for the same attribute
(providing a desired or explicit privacy risk score). Hence,
we study how good users are at assessing their personal pri-
vacy risks based on images.
User Study In this study, we split the survey into two
parts. In the first part, the users are shown a group of 3-6
images. Given the sensitive nature of attributes, we cannot
obtain or ask users to rate their personal images and hence
use images from the dataset. They are asked how comfort-
able they are sharing such images publicly, considering they
are the subject in these images. Responses are collected
on a scale of 1 to 5, where: (1) Extremely comfortable
(2) Slightly comfortable (3) Somewhat comfortable (4) Not
comfortable (5) Extremely uncomfortable. Each group of
images represents one of the 68 privacy attributes. In most
cases, the attributes occur isolated and are the most promi-
nent visual cue in the image. We refer to these responses as
human visual privacy score. The second part is identical to
questions and the setting in the previous user-study on pri-
vacy preferences. Each question is designed to obtain the
privacy preference of the user for each attribute. As before,
the user rates on a scale of 1 (Not Violated) to 5 (Extremely
Violated). We refer to these responses as privacy preference
score.
Participants We split the study into two parts to prevent
user fatigue. Each part contains only half of the attributes.
We obtain 50 unique responses for this survey from AMT.
In each of these parts, roughly: 70% of the respondents
were under 40 years, 57% were male and 87% were from
USA. Additionally, 80% responded that they use Facebook,
84% Twitter and 46% Flickr.
Analysis We compute for each attribute average privacy
preference score and human visual scores, and visualized
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Figure 3: Privacy preferences of user profiles for the privacy attributes. Darker colors represent higher privacy-sensitivity to
attributes. Each row corresponds to one of the 30 profiles and the number in brackets on the Y -axis represents the number of
users mapped to the profile. Rows are ordered based on number of users linked to the profile.
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Figure 4: Users are asked to rate on a scale of 1 (Not vi-
olated) to 5 (Extremely violated) how much an attribute
affects their privacy. X-axis denotes their desired privacy
preference and Y -axis denotes their evaluation of risk on
images. The red markers indicate privacy attributes with
highly underestimated or overestimated user ratings
them as a scatter plot in Figure 4. From the results, we
observe: (i) The off-diagonal data points show a clear in-
consistency in the users between the required privacy pref-
erence and their judgment of privacy risk in images. (ii) For
cases close to the diagonal, like credit cards, passport and
national identification documents, users display consistent
behaviour on images and attributes. (iii) However, when
photographs are natural scenes containing people or ve-
hicles, users underestimate (below diagonal) the privacy
score, such as in the case of family photographs or cars
displaying license plate numbers. We speculate this is in-
dicative of personal photographs commonly shared online.
(iv) They overestimate (above diagonal) the privacy risk of
some photographs showing birth place or their name. We
speculate this is because the photographs are often official
documents, making users more cautious.
5. Predicting Privacy Risks
In this section, we make a step towards our overall goal
of a Visual Privacy Advisor. As illustrated in Figure 5, we
follow a similar paradigm e.g. on social networks that de-
fines privacy risk based on both the content type and user-
specific privacy settings. In our case, the content type is
described by (user-independent) attributes in the previous
section. We combine these with the user-specific privacy
preferences to determine if the image contains a privacy vi-
5
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Figure 5: We learn an end-to-end model for user-specific
privacy risk estimation.
olation.
We describe our model for privacy attribute prediction
in Section 5.1, followed by our approaches to personalized
privacy risk prediction in Section 5.2. We conclude with a
comparison of human judgment of privacy risks in images
against the prediction of our proposed models in Section
5.3.
5.1. Privacy Attribute Prediction
In this section, we define the user-independent task of
predicting privacy attributes from images. Then, we present
and evaluate different methods on our new VISPR dataset.
Task We propose the task of Privacy Attribute Predic-
tion, which is to predict one or more of 68 privacy attributes
based on an image. This can be seen as a multilabel classi-
fication problem that recognizes different type of personal
information visual data and therefore has the potential to
make this information explicit. Figure 1 shows multiple ex-
amples for this task. The task is challenging due to image
diversity, subtle cues and high level semantics.
Metric To assess performance of methods for this task,
we compute the Average Precision (AP) per class, which is
the area under Precision-Recall curve for the attribute. Ad-
ditionally, the overall performance of a method is given by
Class-based Mean Average Precision (C-MAP), the average
of the AP score across all 68 attributes.
Methods We experiment with three types of visual fea-
tures extracted from CNNs – CaffeNet [19], GoogleNet
[41] and ResNet-50 [17]. First, we train a linear SVM
model using features from the layer preceding the last fully-
connected layer of these CNNs. In a pilot study, we found
that the multilabel SVM with smoothed hinge loss [25]
yields better results than SVM multi-label prediction [7]
and cross-entropy loss. Second, we fine-tune the CNNs ini-
tialized with pretrained ImageNet models, based on a multi-
Training Features C-MAP
SVM
CaffeNet 37.93
GoogleNet 39.88
Resnet-50 40.50
End-to-End
CaffeNet 42.99
GoogleNet 43.29
Resnet-50 47.45
Table 2: Accuracy of our methods given by Class-based
Mean Average Precision, evaluated on test
label classification loss with sigmoid activations.
Results Quantitative results of our method are shown
in Table 2 and qualitative results in Figure 6 (more dis-
cussed in supplementary). We additionally present the Av-
erage Precision scores per class in Figure 7. We make the
following observations: (i) The CNN performs well in at-
tributes such as tickets, passports, medical treatment that
correlated well with scenes (e.g. airport, hospital). It also
performs well in recognizing attributes which are human–
centric, such as faces, gender and age. (ii) Fine-grained dif-
ferences cause confusions such as predicting student IDs for
drivers licenses or differentiating between street and other
signboards. (iii) We observe failure modes due to small de-
tails in the image, such as tattoos, marriage rings or a credit
card in the hands of a child. (iv) Another shortcoming is not
being able to recognize relationship-based attributes (e.g.,
personal or social relationships, vehicle ownership) which
requires reasoning based on interaction of multiple visual
cues in an image rather than just their presence.
5.2. Personalizing Privacy Risk Prediction
In the previous section, we discussed predicting privacy
attributes in images, a task independent of user privacy pref-
erences. In this section, we investigate user-specific visual
privacy feedback. The goal is to compute a privacy risk
score per image, representing the risk of privacy leakage
for the particular user.
Task As illustrated in Figure 5, we combine privacy at-
tributes (user independent) together with the privacy pref-
erences based on these attributes (user specific) to arrive at
the privacy risk score. As we allow the users to give scores
for each attributes based on their privacy preferences, we
define the following privacy risk score.
Definition 1. Privacy Risk Score. For some image x, at-
tributes y ∈ [0, 1]A and user preference u ∈ [0, 5]A, the
privacy risk score of image x containing attributes y on user
u is maxa yaua
This represents the user-specific score of the most sensi-
tive attribute, most likely to be present in an image. As a re-
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Figure 6: Qualitative Results of our Privacy Attribute Prediction method
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Figure 7: Average Precision (AP) Scores for the privacy attributes from our method
sult, the privacy-risk score is comparable to the preference-
score: 1 (Not Sensitive) to 5 (Extremely Sensitive). As il-
lustrated in Figure 5, we compute the ground-truth privacy
risk score based on ground-truth attribute annotation for an
image (represented as a k-hot vector y ∈ {0, 1}A) and pri-
vacy preferences of users.
Method: Attribute Prediction-Based Privacy Risk (AP-
PR) Our first method performs Attributed-Based Privacy
Risk (AP-PR) prediction. As illustrated in Figure 5, we
combine the privacy attribute prediction and the profile’s
privacy preferences (that we can assume as provided by
users at test time) to compute the privacy risk score as de-
fined above.
Method: Privacy Risk CNN (PR-CNN) We propose a
Privacy Risk CNN (PR-CNN) that does not directly use the
user profile’s privacy preferences – but only indirectly via
the ground-truth. The key observation is that AP-PR scores
suffer from erroneous attribute predictions (see Figure 7).
Therefore, we extend the the privacy attribute prediction
network by additional fully-connected layers to directly pre-
dict the privacy risk score. A parameter search yielded best
results using additional two fully-connected hidden layers
of 128 neurons, each followed by sigmoid activations. We
L1-Error MAP
1+ 2+ 3+ 4+
AP-PR 0.656 94.94 94.27 87.97 77.89
PR-CNN 0.637 94.35 93.65 88.14 78.38
Table 3: Evaluation of Personalized Privacy Risk
finetune this network from our Googlenet Privacy Attribute
Prediction network for 30 user profiles described in Section
4 and a Euclidean loss.
Evaluation We use two metrics for evaluation. First, the
L1 error averaged over all images and profiles; it represents
the mean absolute difference between the ratings. Secondly,
we calculate the Precision-Recall curves for varying thresh-
olds of sensitivity which indicates how well our models de-
tect images above a certain true privacy risk. By calculat-
ing the area under the Precision-Recall curves over all user
profiles, we additionally report the Mean Average Precision
(MAP).
In our experiments, we use the previously introduced
user-profiles instead of individual users in order to cater to
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Figure 8: Performance of our approach in predicting Pri-
vacy Risks of images. Our approach performs better on high
privacy-risk images.
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Figure 9: The Precision-Recall curves of three risk estima-
tions are displayed – users implicitly evaluating risk from
images and our two methods AP-PR and PR-CNN.
all the diverse privacy preferences equally that we have seen
in the previous section. We assign a privacy risk score of 0.5
for the safe attribute for all profiles.
The evaluation of our approach on these metrics is pre-
sented in Table 3. Each graph in Figure 8 represents PR
curves over the ground-truth thresholded to obtain a partic-
ular risk interval, such that any score above this threshold is
considered private. This allows us to estimate performance
of methods at various levels of sensitivity. We then obtain
the PR-curves for each sensitivity interval by thresholding
scores estimated by AP-PR and PR-CNN.
From these results, we observe: (i) PR-CNN performs
better in predicting risk compared to using the intermediate
attributes predictions. Notably, the prediction is on average
less than one step on the scale from 1 to 5 away from the true
privacy risk. (ii) Moreover, it is better at detecting high-risk
images, as shown in Figure 8. In particular, we notice better
recall for high-risk images. We discuss profile-specific PR
curves in the supplementary material.
5.3. Humans vs. Machine
In Section 4, we have shown inconsistency in users’ pri-
vacy preferences and their assessment of privacy risks in
images. In this section, we compare our proposed approach
for evaluating privacy risk against human judgments.
In our second user study (subsection 4.2), for each at-
tribute, users first assessed their personal privacy risk on im-
ages (providing a visual privacy risk score) and later rated
their privacy preference (providing a desired privacy risk
score). We have computed scores with our privacy risk
models AP-PR and PR-CNN on those very same images.
As a result, for each image, we have (a) users’ pri-
vacy preference (b) users’ privacy risk judgment from im-
ages (c) our AP-PR privacy risk score from images (d) our
PR-CNN privacy risk score from images. All these scores
are on a scale of 1 (Not Sensitive) to 5 (Extremely Sen-
sitive). Using the users desired preference as the ground-
truth, we now ask: who is better at reproducing the user’s
desired privacy preference on images? As from the previ-
ous section, we use precision-recall and L1-error as metrics
to compare the desired preference score (a) and predicted
privacy risk score for evaluation (b, c, d).
The precision-recall-curves for the three candidates are
presented in Figure 9. Evaluation using the L1-error is
discussed in the supplementary material. We observe:
(i) AP-PR achieves better precision-recall for the task than
PR-CNN and – remarkably – is even consistently better
than the users’ image-based judgment. (ii) On average, the
PR-CNN estimates privacy risks (L1 error = 1.03) slightly
better than the user’s image-based judgment (L1 error = 1.1)
and AP-PR (L1 error = 1.27).
6. Conclusion
We have extended the concept of privacy settings to vi-
sual content and have presented work towards a Visual Pri-
vacy Advisor that can provide feedback to the users based
on their privacy preferences. The significance of this re-
search direction is highlighted by our user study which
shows users often fail to enforce their own privacy prefer-
ences when judging image content. Our survey also cap-
tures typical privacy preference profiles that show a sur-
prising level of diversity. Our new VISPR dataset allowed
us to train visual models that recognize privacy attributes,
predict privacy risk scores and detect images that conflict
with user’s privacy. In particular, a final comparison of hu-
man vs. machine prediction of privacy risks on images,
shows an improvement by our model over human judgment.
This highlights the feasibility and future opportunities of the
overarching goal – a Visual Privacy Advisor.
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Appendices
A. Privacy Attributes and Examples
A complete list of privacy attributes with descriptions
and an example image is given in Table 4. We consider
all these cases when viewing the image in its original high-
resolution form. We use these definitions to any subject in
the image – either in the foreground or background. Us-
ing these definitions, attributes can be typically inferred
from an image in multiple ways: (a) Direct: it is explic-
itly mentioned, such as in a form or document (e.g. gen-
der on an identity card) (b) Visual: based on visual cues
(e.g. gender from clothing or facial features) (c) Reason-
ing: it is inferred by some additional reasoning (e.g. rela-
tionships based on age differences between multiple peo-
ple). Dataset is available on the project website: https:
//tribhuvanesh.github.io/vpa/.
B. Additional Details on User Study
In this section, we provide additional details on the user
study discussed in Section 4.
B.1. Understanding Users’ Privacy Preferences
The task in this user study is to obtain user preferences
over the 67 privacy attributes (excludes the attribute safe).
The questionnaire instructs the user on a fictitious web-
site (similar to Flickr or Twitter), where content posted is
by default visible to everyone else on the platform. By
unintentionally posting information about a particular at-
tribute, the user exposes private information comprising
his/her anonymity. Each question is a verbal description
of one of the attributes (Figure 10). We collect responses
on a scale of 1-5 of how much the user finds his/her privacy
violated as a consequence of this action.
Instructions provided to the Users
In this academic survey we want to understand how sensi-
tive you are to certain details of your personal or private
life. For instance, are you more comfortable sharing your
full name, gender or details on your personal relationships?
We refer to these details of your personal or private life
as ”Personally Identifiable Information” (PII).
PII is information that can be used on its own or with
other information to identify, contact, or locate a single per-
son, or to identify an individual. Such information could be
one or more of your: Full Name, Home Address, Political
Opinion, etc.
Following this description are a list of PIIs. For each
of these PIIs, consider the following situation: On an on-
line public platform, you create an anonymous account. On
this platform, once you post something, you cannot delete it.
Figure 10: Questions from user study to understand privacy
preferences
Only the moderators can delete this post. However, they can
be extremely slow and unresponsive. One day, you uninten-
tionally shared/posted this PII about yourself. Immediately,
you realize that you cannot delete this post.
On a scale of 1-5, please rate how much you feel your
privacy is violated by this action, where:
1 - I feel my privacy is not violated. So, I wouldn’t care.
2 - I feel my privacy is slightly violated. However, it’s not
worth taking any action.
3 - I feel my privacy is somewhat violated. I will message
the moderator. In case there’s no response, I will give up.
4 - I feel my privacy is violated. I will inform the moderator
and follow up for a few days. In case there’s no response
after that, I will give up.
5 - I feel my privacy is extremely violated. I will not give up
until this post is deleted.
B.2. Users and Visual Privacy Judgment
In order to understand how good are users at identify-
ing privacy risks from images, we conduct this user study
in two parts. In the first part, we instruct users on a ficti-
tious photo-sharing website, where images shared are pub-
licly available. For each of the 68 privacy attributes, we
present a question on a group of images from the dataset
representing this attribute (Figure 11). The user responds
how comfortable he/she is posting such images on the web-
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Group Attribute Description Examples
Personal
Description
Gender Subject’s gender is clearly visible using one or more
gender-specific discriminative visual cues such as more
than 50% body being visible, clothing, facial/head hair
or colored nails.
Eye Color If eyes are visible and can be categorized as one of:
brown, hazel, blue or green.
Hair Color Subject’s head hair color is visible
Fingerprint Fingerprint is visible through either a close-up shot of
one’s finger or adu -sh . n imprint on some surface.
Signature Complete signature is visible in an image, such as in a
form or document
Face (Complete) A face is completely visible. Also includes photographs
of faces on identity cards, documents or billboards.
Face (Partial) Less than 70% of the face is visible or there is occlusion,
such as when the subject is wearing sun-glasses.
Tattoo Subject displays either a tattoo or body paint.
Nudity (Partial) Subject appears in undergarments
Nudity (Complete) Human subject appears without clothing
Race Any subject in the photograph can be categorized into
one of Caucasian, Asian or Negroid.
(Skin) Color One’s skin color can be categorized into one of White,
Brown or Black.
Traditional Clothing Subject appears in clothing which is indicative of a par-
ticular region or country e.g. dirndl, sari.
Table 4: List of Privacy Attributes including their definitions and examples
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Group Attribute Description Examples
Full Name A recognizable full name which appears in the context
of a form, document or a badge. Also includes if the
name can be inferred from a signature.
Name (First) Only if the first name is visible on a form, document,
badge or clothing.
Name (Last) Only if the last name is visible on a form, document,
badge or clothing.
Place of Birth Place of Birth is explicitly mentioned, such as in a form
or in an identification document.
Date of Birth Date of Birth is explicitly mentioned in writing. Includes
year, month or the day of birth.
Nationality A passport indicating country is clearly visible. Includes
the case if a subject appears holding a country’s flag or
wearing a uniform bearing the flag (such as a soldier or
an international athlete).
Handwriting Hand-written text on any surface.
Marital status A subject is wearing an engagement ring. Includes wed-
ding photographs taken of the bride and groom.
Documents National Identification Documents such as a Green Card or a European national
identity card, not including passports.
Credit Card Either the front or back of a credit card. Includes cases
when the card is partially visible e.g. in someone’s hand
or in a shredded form
Passport A photograph of any page in the passport or its front
cover.
Drivers License Either front or back of a drivers license or a driving per-
mit.
Student ID Front or back of a student identity card, with at least the
name of a school, college or university clearly readable.
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Group Attribute Description Examples
Mail Contents of a mail or the envelope.
Receipts Purchase receipts indicating a financial transaction with
an amount clearly visible, e.g. a restaurant receipt.
Tickets A travel, movie or concert ticket which specifies travel
location or an event.
Health Physical disability Subject appears with a permanent physical disability e.g.
an amputee or a person in a wheelchair.
Medical Treatment Subject appears either with an injury or indicates hospi-
tal admittance.
Medical History Photographs of medicine or medical prescriptions.
Employment Occupation Subject appears in a distinguishable occupation-specific
uniform e.g. doctor, policemen, construction worker.
Work Occasion Subject is photographed while giving a talk, presenta-
tion, attending a work-related or broad-casting event.
Includes photographs of people in formal attire in an of-
fice.
Personal
Life
Religion Subject appears associated with a distinguishable reli-
gious symbol, religion-specific clothing or at a religious
location.
Sexual Orientation Two subjects are photographed in an intimate setting
Culture Subjects appear celebrating a traditional festival or at-
tending an art or culture related activity e.g. concert,
play.
Hobbies A non-professional related activity of a subject is visible
e.g. playing a musical instrument, taking photographs.
Sports Subject appears taking part in an indoor or outdoor
sports activity
14
Group Attribute Description Examples
Education history Photographs contains cues indicating subject’s educa-
tion history, such as at a graduation ceremony, clothing
indicating university or an academic or school certificate
Legal involvement Photographs indicating subject’s involvement with law-
related activities e.g. someone being arrested, in a court
hearing.
Personal Occasion Photographs of people celebrating a personal occasion
with friends or family members e.g. wedding, birthday.
General Opinion Subject appears associated with a placard or clothing
indicating opinion on general issues e.g. wars, taxes,
LGBT rights.
Political Opinion Subject appears with either clothing, placard or in a
crowd at a political rally.
Relationships Personal Relationships Photographs of people in a visually-identifiable personal
relationship e.g. mother-son, husband-wife.
Social Circle Subjects of the same age-group photographed in a ca-
sual setting e.g. friends at a party, walking together on a
street.
Professional Circle A group of people who share an occupation (e.g. a group
of policemen) or who are dressed for a professional
event (e.g. a conference or meeting).
Competitors A group of people taking part in team sports. Also in-
cludes the case when subjects belong to the same team.
Spectators A group of people spectating an event such as a concert
or play.
Similar view A group of people at a rally or a protest who share opin-
ions on a general issue. Only includes the case when
placards or clothing denoting a cause or rallying for a
political party is visible.
Whereabouts Visited Landmark Photograph contains text indicating a business’ name,
street sign or a well-known landmark.
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Group Attribute Description Examples
Visited Location (Com-
plete)
Text indicating a complete address (e.g. restaurant re-
ceipt with the address of the restaurant) or a screen-shot
of GPS-based location.
Visited Location (Par-
tial)
Text which partially indicates the subject’s location,
such as street name, city or country where the photo-
graph was taken.
Home address (Com-
plete)
Photograph containing a complete non-commercial
postal address.
Home address (Partial) Photograph containing a partial non-commercial postal
address.
Date/Time of Activity Photograph contains information of date and/or time of
subject’s location or activity such as a time-stamp wa-
termark in an image, or a clock in the photograph.
Phone no. A phone number that is visible in the photograph (either
personal or commercial).
Internet Ac-
tivity
Username A screen shot of a website which mentions any username
or internet handles.
Email address Any complete valid email-address that appears in a pho-
tograph or a screen-shot.
Email content Screenshots of emails including the subject of the email,
or parts of the email body content.
Online conversations Screenshots of online conversations, posts, tweets or in-
ternet activity by any user.
Automobile Vehicle Ownership Photograph of a person riding a motor vehicle.
License Plate (Com-
plete)
A clearly visible license plate or registration number of
any motor vehicle.
License Plate (Partial) A partial license plate or registration number of any mo-
tor vehicle
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Figure 11: Questions from the user study to evaluate user
privacy judgment
site. The exact instructions for this part is provided below.
In the second part, we obtain user preferences over the
attributes following the exact instructions in the previous
section.
Instructions provided to the Users
In this academic survey we want to understand your comfort
level sharing things on the internet.
Following this description are groups of images. For
each of these groups of images, consider the following sit-
uation: On an online public platform, you create an ac-
count. On this platform, you are allowed to post pho-
tographs, which anyone can view. Moreover, you can also
interact with other users who shared their photographs and
can comment on or like them.
Important: For each of the below groups of images, pic-
ture yourself as either being the subject in the photograph,
or the one who took the photograph of a family-member.
On a scale of 1-5, rate how comfortable you are sharing
such photographs, where:
1 - You are extremely comfortable sharing such photographs
2 - You are slightly comfortable sharing such photographs
3 - You are somewhat comfortable sharing such pho-
tographs
4 - You are not comfortable sharing such photographs
5 - You are extremely uncomfortable sharing such pho-
tographs
C. Additional Qualitative Examples for Pri-
vacy Attribute Prediction
In Section 5.1 we discussed our approach to Privacy At-
tribute Prediction – a user-independent method of predict-
ing multiple privacy attributes given an image. In this sec-
tion, in addition to Figure 6, we present additional quali-
tative examples in Figure 12. Each row represents images
of a particular privacy attribute. The True Positives column
indicate the case when this attribute is in both the ground-
truth and predicted set of privacy attributes. The False Pos-
itives column indicate images when the attribute is incor-
rectly predicted. The False Negatives column indicate im-
ages when the attribute is in ground-truth, but is not pre-
dicted.
We observe our method associates privacy attributes to
distinctive visual cues such as clothing (for occupation and
ethnic clothing), exposed skin (for tattoos, nudity), metallic
objects with wheels (for physical disability, license plates)
and text (for names, drivers license, username, handwrit-
ing). As a result, apart from correct predictions, we find
that this also leads to incorrectly predicting attributes (e.g.
predicting card-shaped identification documents as drivers
licenses, cars for license plates) or failing to recognize at-
tributes in a different context (e.g. handwriting on a wall
instead of documents, new types of drivers licenses). We
also observe our approach underperform in differentiating
between full, first and last names, or usernames and email
addresses (which requires text-based reasoning), identify-
ing relationships and sexual orientation (which requires in-
terpreting interaction between multiple people) and differ-
entiating occupations, religion and ethnic clothing (which
requires fine-grained recognition).
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True Positives False Positives False Negatives
Credit Card
Ethnic
Clothing
Full Name
Hobbies
Passport
Sexual
Orientation
Medical
History
Drivers
License
Handwriting
Occupation
Personal
Relationships
Username
License Plate
(Complete)
Figure 12: Additional Qualitative Results of our Privacy Attribute Prediction method
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Figure 13: L1 errors over attributes
D. Additional Results for Personalized Privacy
Prediction
D.1. Qualitative Results
In this section, we discuss additional results for Section
5.2: Personalizing Privacy Risk Prediction.
Figure 14 presents qualitative results for our approach
to user-specific Personalized Privacy Risk Prediction dis-
cussed in Section 5.2. To visualize the qualitative results
over all 30 user profiles simultaneously, we present a scat-
ter plot of ground-truth vs. predicted scores for each image.
Each point in the scatter plot represents one user-profile. In
these plots, points closer to the diagonal (dotted line) indi-
cate lower errors. Points above the diagonal indicate risk
over-estimation and under the diagonal indicate risk under-
estimation.
We observe from the qualitative results and w.r.t each
row in Figure 14: (i) (First row) presents examples with
correct high confidence attribute predictions according to
the posterior probability. Here, both AP-PR and PR-CNN
perform equally well. (ii) (Second row) presents examples
where attribute predictions are noisy. In these, PR-CNN
outperforms AP-PR. (iii) (Third row) Both AP-PR and
PR-CNN are challenged by difficult images (low contrast,
unnatural angles, low lighting, occlusion). However, we
see that PR-CNN often performs slightly better than AP-PR
in these cases. (iv) (Fourth row) presents examples where
AP-PR with correct attribute predictions performs better
than PR-CNN.
D.2. Precision-Recall Curves for User Profiles
Section 5.2 discussed Precision-Recall curves evaluated
over all profiles. These were obtained by treating the
privacy risk-prediction as a binary classification problem,
where images above a certain risk score (3+ and 4+ previ-
ously) is considered private per user profile.
In Figure 15, we present the Precision-Recall curves
evaluated over groups of profiles and additional risk thresh-
olds. To generate the curves in these figures, we first create
four groups of profiles, with an equal number of profiles
in each group. We refer to these groups as quartiles Q1-Q4.
We then obtain the Precision-Recall curves for each of these
quartiles.
We observe that PR-CNN displays better performance
for high-risk images over all quartiles of the 30 user profiles
and hence contributing to an overall better performance.
Additionally, we observe a similar pattern with the L1-
error metric (the absolute difference in scores), where PR-
CNN (error = 0.67) incurs lower error in scores for private
images compared to AP-PR (error = 0.84). However, AP-
PR (error = 0.34) performs better for safe images in com-
parison to PR-CNN (error = 0.58).
E. Additional Results for Humans vs. Machine
In Section 5.3, we discussed the performance of our Pri-
vacy Risk Evaluation Methods when compared to the users
themselves. The performance evaluation was primarily with
Precision-Recall curves.
In this section, we discuss performance when evaluated
using L1 as a distance metric between the ground-truth pri-
vacy scores (user’s specified preferences) and the privacy
risk estimation using three approaches (user’s visual risk
assessment and our two proposed approaches – AP-PR and
PR-CNN). The L1 distance here measures the absolute dif-
ference in risk score (where risk scores are between 1–5).
Figure 13 presents these errors per attribute.
We observe from these results: (i) On average (horizon-
tal lines), the PR-CNN estimates privacy risks (L1 error =
1.03) slightly better than the user’s image-based judgment
(L1 error = 1.1) (ii) Users often misjudge the risk (right end
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Figure 14: Qualitative results for Personalized Privacy Risk Prediction
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Figure 15: Precision-Recall curves when visualized over groups of user profiles
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of figure) from natural-looking images such as cars with
visible license plates or family photographs depicting re-
lationships. In these cases, PR-CNN is better at evaluating
risks. (iii) Considering the attributes in which AP-PR incurs
high errors (e.g. relationships, addresses, username, signa-
ture, credit card), we see that PR-CNN outperforms in all
these cases bypassing incorrect attribute predictions.
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